Socially Extended Knowledge is the second of two international conferences on the topic of 'Extended Knowledge.' The aim of the first  'Extended Knowledge Conference' was to bring together leading scholars from around the world in order to critically examine the ramifications of the extended cognition programme (and related views) to contemporary epistemology, and to the theory of knowledge in particular. In this second conference on the topic of 'Socially Extended Knowledge', leading epistemologists, cyberneticists, philosophers of mind, psychologists and Web scientists will move further to explore the impact of the distributed cognition programme on analytic epistemology. 

The main event will take place on Thursday and Friday, October 8 and 9 and it will close with a public lecture by Prof Michael Lynch . 

The following is an indicative list of the more specific questions that the conference is anticipated to address:

● If extended knowledge requires us to treat knowledge-conducive cognitive processes as environmentally extended, then does socially extended knowledge require us to treat such processes as being extended across a specifically social environment? Are standard views about the nature of knowledge-conducive cognitive processes compatible with the idea that these cognitive processes are socially extended?

● Does the fact that the knowledge is specifically socially extended have ramifications for the cognitive responsibility of the knowing agent? For example, is the individual knowing agent’s cognitive responsibility less important to such knowledge on account of there being a wider cognitive responsibility which is distributed across agents in that social environment?

● Assuming that the presence of socio-epistemic norms are necessary for governing the behaviour of epistemic group agents, how should we understand such norms? Can they be reduced to the norms governing individuals? If not, does the possibility of socially extended knowledge governed by irreducible socio-epistemic norms raise concerns related to epistemic relativism?

● Given that the concept of epistemic virtues plays a central role within mainstream individualistic epistemology even in cases where the latter is extended, should we expect that a similar concept will play a central role in the case of socially extended knowledge? How should we conceptualize the idea of distributed epistemic virtues?

● Given that reliance on others is a necessary property for any socio-epistemic system, however loosely or tightly organised, what is the best way to understand the concepts of trust and reputation within epistemology?

● Is there a way to conceptualise the minds of both groups and individuals as arising our of the same physical processes? And if there is such a unified approach to both individual and group minds, what are the ramifications for allegedly sharp distinctions between "internal" and "external" mental phenomena, including knowledge and intentionality?

● Within mainstream individualistic epistemology, there is a long standing debate concerning the relation between propositional and procedural knowledge. The possibility of socially extended knowledge, however, can provide a whole new dimension to the debate concerning the aforementioned relation. Does group know-how reduce to propositional knowledge? If not, can it at least be reduced to individual procedural knowledge?

● The idea of socially extended knowledge can have far reaching ramifications within philosophy of mind and cognitive science. How can prominent theories (such as the enactive approach and the idea of autopoietic systems) originating from the latter two disciplines can be brought to bear to our understanding of socially extended knowledge and vice versa ?

● The idea of collective memory is perhaps one of the most widely studied topics within the field of distributed cognition, as studied by cognitive psychologists. So how should we think about knowledge acquired on the basis of collective memory processes, and is it possible for a group to suffer from collective amnesia (or even impose it to its own self)?

● Given that justification is a necessary component of knowledge, how should we think about it in the case of extended and distributed epistemic agents? And given all the possible metaphysical arguments for the existence of extended and distributed cognitive systems, what is the most fruitful approach for studying their epistemic nature?


Note: Lunches and the conference dinner buffet are free for all attendants, but registration is required for catering purposes. The registration deadline is September 30, 2015. To contact us, email Adam Carter at j.adam.carter@ed.ac.uk, or Orestis Palermos at S.O.Palermos@ed.ac.uk.